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PANEL DISCUSSION: ENERGY REGULATION IN MEXICO
MODERATOR: EWELL E. MURPHY, JR.*
PANEL MEMBERS: MIGUEL JAUREGUI ROJAS,**
WILLIAM D. DeGRANDIS,*** ABDON HERNANDEZ****
Ewell Murphy: We have heard descriptions of three very important
Mexican industries. In at least one of them, the hard minerals industry,
there have been remarkable openings in the new legislation. In the electric
power industry, we have seen some clarification of investment rights,
i.e., affirmative clarifications. While this legislative change has been going
on in Mexico, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)' has
been created and suddenly, in theory, given rights to Canadian and United
States investors. With the new laws and with NAFTA, do you think
that Canadian and United States investors have any greater access to the
industries you have talked about than other foreign investors may have,
e.g., investors from Japan or Europe.
Abdon Herndndez: Since the new law was enacted, numerous companies
from Canada and the United States are coming to Mexico due to the
proper legal framework. This is also because the environmentalists in
Canada and the United States are shutting down their domestic companies,
and because of high corporate expenses for reclaiming lands that are
being environmentally damaged. In addition, the United States and Canada
are going to Mexico because, with NAFTA, there will be more value to
mineral products exported from Mexico. NAFTA was just the "icing on
the cake." The main reasons why Canadian and United States producers
are going to Mexico are the environmental restrictions in Canada and
United States and the opening of the Mexican mining industry to foreign
investors.
Murphy: In terms of actual legal access to Mexican mining concessions,
would a Japanese mining company now have as much access as a Canadian
or United States contpany?
Herndndez: Yes, it would. As a matter of fact, the Japanese government
is actively involved in exploration for the Mexican government as a
contractor. At the company I work with, we have a joint venture with
the Japanese, which has been rather difficult. The Japanese have assigned
Mexico to Sumitomo, which is the vehicle for mining activities in Mexico,
whereas Mitsui is the Japanese vehicle for mining activities in Peru.
Murphy: Does this create any antitrust problems?
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Herndndez: I do not know. It is a government action. I assume the
Japanese have sovereign immunity protection.
Murphy: What about the electric power industry? Would you say that
Canadian and United States investors have any special access that foreign
investors generally do not have?
William DeGrandis: There are Japanese, French and other companies
already involved in some of these consortiums. I do not think United
States companies have any legal edge, but the United States Independent
Power Producers (IPPs) and power companies have been doing this longer
than other entities, certainly of any Canadian company that I can think
of, except for North Canadian Power. The Japanese and the French
companies, except for Electricit6 de France, have mainly been equipment
suppliers. They are only recently taking a developer role to sell their
equipment. Thus, United States companies may have a practical edge
because they are used to being involved in these partnerships. I believe
that, strategically, to spread risk, there will be more consortiums like
Samayuka, involving United States, Japanese and Canadian companies,
all taking their respective roles and risks. But I do not believe a United
States company has any special legal advantage.
Murphy: What about the oil industry, specifically the oil service in-
dustry: contractors, suppliers and manufacturers of secondary petro-
chemicals. Does NAFTA give Canadian or United States investors any
access to that area that is not generally available to foreign investors?
Miguel Jauregui: I think you have to differentiate. The only area where
United States and Canadian investors have an advantage is in government
procurement. Everything else is on a level playing field.
Murphy: To the extent that procurement would involve electric power,
then the same thing would apply for electric power.
DeGrandis: I would agree.
Murphy: Mr. Herndndez, you were also talking about the new mining
law. You said that, consistent with the Constitution, the new mining law
requires foreign concessions to be taken through Mexican companies.
Herndndez: Yes.
Murphy: Regarding Mexican companies, were you thinking only of
Sociedades Andnimas and S.A. de C.V. as the main corporate structures
for mining or could other forms of legal organization be used?
Herndndez: In fact, in the field of mining, Sociedad de Responsibilidad
Limitadas (S.R.L.s) are very popular.
Murphy: For tax reasons, I could see that would really work for
mining.
Herndndez: Right. In addition, I have seen at least one set of bylaws
of a S.R.L. which has different allocations of voting rights so that, in
effect, a voting trust exists. There may be social parts split into new
100 peso parts. There may be various categories of social parts, with
some limited voting rights and with other kinds of special rights.
Murphy: This becomes very sophisticated.
Herndndez: There is more flexibility because one does not have to
register the articles of incorporation (institutos de incorporaci6n). This
[Vol. 3
ENERGY REGULATION IN MEXICO
is one of the major distinctions from United States companies. In the
United States there are articles of incorporation; in Mexico, institutos
de incorporacidn. But in Mexico there is no judicial review. Formerly,
it was necessary to register the institutos in the Public Registry of Property.
One would also have to go to court, where the Attorney General's Office,
more as a formality, would ensure compliance with the law, although it
is a private law. Today, there is no judicial review; thus one has much
more flexibility.
Ignacio Gdmez-Palacio: Cultural background must be taken into ac-
count when you think about Mexico. Mexican corporate law must be
viewed through the eyes of Mexican culture, with the eyes of a Mexican
counsel. One cannot just go in and "Japanize," "Americanize" or
"Canadianize" Mexico. The mentality of Mexico is comprised of seventeen
million Indians and other mixed cultures. Our concept of progress is like
that of the United States; however, the United States mentality is closer,
than Mexico, to that of Europe.
Murphy: You said it very well-every country has to be true to its
own cultural identity.
Jauregui: About eighteen years ago, Mr. Herndndez and I drafted the
charter and bylaws, for tax purposes, of the first Mexican S.R.L. It was
a joint venture between Peftoles and AMEX to extract copper. One of
the features incorporated was the "bucket of oil" clause, whereby cor-
porate investors could profit-share as partners in the S.R.L., either in
kind with copper extracted or in cash if the copper was sold. This created
the necessity to prove to United States tax authorities that this was a
mining partnership.
Murphy: This is really interesting. It is my understanding that, at least
until now, one must get clearance from the Ministry of Foreign Relations
to form a Mexican company that is going to have foreign participation.
There has to be something like a Calvo clause2 stating that foreigners
will not appeal to their government for support in the event of claims
against the Mexican government. Is this still required by the language
from Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution?
Herndndez: A permit from the Foreign Affairs Ministry is still required,
but your application need only include: (1) the preferred names of the
corporate entity and (2) whether to include an exclusion clause for
foreigners or a Calvo clause.' It is really a formality.
Murphy: But is it correct that you still have either an exclusion of
foreign investors or a Calvo clause reference?
Herndndez: Yes.
Murphy: By agreement of the three countries under NAFTA, Mexican,
United States and Canadian investors have been given the right to appeal
to their sovereign government for help in the event of an expropriation
2. Named for the Argentine diplomat and jurist, Carlos Cavo (1824-1906), this term refers
generally to the waivers he advocated of a foreigner's access to foreign tribunals and diplomatic
espousal of the foreigner's claim against the local sovereign.
3. CONsTITucI6N POLiTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [CONST.-PoLrrICAL CONSTInON
OF ThE UNITED MEXICAN STATES], art. 27 § IV (10th ed. Delma Edition) (Mex.).
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U.S. -MEXICO LAW JOURNAL
or in an arbitration, through the arbitration provisions of NAFTA. This
seems to be inconsistent with the Calvo clause. In spite of that, I
understand that the Calvo clause will still be required of United States
and Canadian investors.
Herndndez: Rafael Estrada can cast some light on this.
Rafael Estrade: Under NAFTA, a commission representing the three
governments is going to be established. That would be the proper forum
for a United States or Canadian investor to go to for protection. Whether
that is a violation of the Calvo clause or not is uncertain.
Murphy: No, it is an argument. I can see the issue here.
Estrada: The treaty commission is a multi-national entity.
Jauregui: I would like to add a couple of comments. The Calvo clause
has perhaps been tampered with. The decree that was drawn up in 1993,
prior to the signing of NAFTA, states that the Calvo clause is specifically
not applicable where there is an international treaty. As you know, Mexico
treats NAFTA as a treaty, not as an agreement.
Murphy: Was this a presidential decree?
Jauregui: It was a presidential decree that was drafted by the Ministry
of Foreign Relations dealing with the applicability of the Calvo clause
as it relates to international treaties. The decree states that the Calvo
clause is not applicable in a scenario involving an international treaty.
Murphy: Essentially, if we argue that NAFTA gives Canadian and
United States investors the right to be exempt from application of the
Calvo clause, this decree in effect says that an international treaty such
as NAFTA can do just that.
Jauregui: This exemption would not involve the normal dealings of
the company. In my opinion, the applicability of the Calvo clause is
ultimately dependent on the chapters of NAFTA. If the subject is covered
by NAFTA, the Calvo clause would not apply; if the subject is not
covered by NAFTA, the Calvo clause would apply.
Murphy: Suppose that a United States investor wanted to claim against
the Mexican government, but did not want to go through the NAFTA
mechanism. Would the Calvo clause prevent such an investor from ob-
taining the support of the government as a mechanism for that?
Jauregui: Sure.
Murphy: That is a very sophisticated way to rationalize the whole
thing. Let us have comments and questions from the audience.
Estrada: I have a preoccupation triggered by an assertion made by
Abdon Herndndez, who said, more or less, that the legislative and
regulatory activity of the federal government under the Salinas Admin-
istration has demonstrated consistency between political speeches and
action. I tend to agree with that statement, but I would like to remind
everyone that Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution has a paragraph
which empowers the federal Congress to declare any economic activity
in Mexico as reserved to the government. For instance, if Congress were
to state that the production and commercialization of neckties is a strategic
economic activity, then this declaration, by the simple act of Congress,
reserves this particular economic activity to the government. This has
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been overlooked by the Mexican business community and the time has
come to ask for a complete reform of Article 28. Salinas has carried
out very important economic reforms which have opened many oppor-
tunities for business in Mexico, both from local and foreign investment.
With Zedillo in the presidency, economic reform may be reversed through
acts of Congress without the need to fight for the approval of consti-
tutional reform.
Herndndez: I believe that in key issues for private enterprise and for
the business community, there has been consistency. There are other
things that as lawyers, perhaps, we ought to be aware of. For example,
your reference to Article 28 of the Constitution. If Mexico did have an
independent legislative branch that really voted in accordance with the
mandate of their constituency, they would probably not approve the
changes of law mentioned. Of course, the phrase "act of Congress" is
used. If Congress said "pursuant to regulatory powers of Article 89 of
the Constitution," that would be more problematic. At least Article 28
says Congress, although the representatives of the Partido de Acci6n
Nacional (PAN) and the Cdrdinistas did not get as many reforms as
they would have desired. At least progress is being made in the right
direction. If Mexico ever reaches a moment when a separation of powers
truly exists, then all will be safe.
Jauregui: I am concerned about Article 28, an act of Congress and
the rules of law. The Salinas Administration liberalized the mining in-
dustry, foreign investment and banking, and obtained a "stamp of ap-
proval" by adoption of NAFTA. It is not that it is a "cure-all"; it is
just a stamp of approval. However, it is going to be very difficult to
go back on this liberalization because it is supported by a long series
of commitments. The laws in Mexico are in place, but there is some
difficulty in enforcing them without a proper judiciary. Therefore, I
would say that this factor is not only up to the Zedillo Administration,
but also to the Mexican people. In my opinion, the Mexican government
is now ineffective. It is up to private people and entrepreneurs to take
care of this problem. We must make sure that the Mexican treasury does
not get in the way of the ergo omnes and application of our decrees.
Also, nothing must stand in the way of the prevalence of the law. This
is really the challenge of the future.
Ken Hoffman: I have three questions. First, does anyone have any
estimate as to when the new regulations might come out under the 1993
Foreign Investment Law?4 The second question speaks strictly to energy.
I understand that there was previously a provision for a twenty year
trust to allow for 100010 foreign participation in secondary petrochemicals.
This is no longer necessary because all secondary petrochemicals are open.
Is there any chance that a trust arrangement could be used in the basic
4. Reglamento de la Ley de Comercio Exterior [Regulations to the Law of Foreign Commerce],
DRIo OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACI6N [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE FEDERATION] (Primera Secci6n) (Dec.
30, 1993) (Mex.).
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petrochemicals? The third question also relates to basic petrochemicals.
There is a conflict that needs to be resolved between the list of eight
basic petrochemicals under the Mexican law and the definition of basic
petrochemicals under NAFTA.5 I assume there is now a mechanism that
will resolve this, but how and when?
Jauregui: Yes, there is. The purpose of a trust is to avoid conveying
to the private investor the right to manufacture, exploit or sell basic
petrochemicals. Eut trusts enable a private investor to participate in some
form in the production of basic petrochemicals or in the establishment
of plants to manufacture basic petrochemicals.
Murphy: The third question was, "Is there an inconsistency between
the definition of the eight basic petrochemicals in the Mexican Foreign
Investment Law and the NAFTA provisions?"
Jauregui: Yes, there is an inconsistency and I believe that in the
hierarchy of laws, NAFTA would prevail.
Murphy: With most favored nation treatment, would NAFTA nationals
have the access of all foreign nationals under the Foreign Investment
Law?
Jauregui: Exactly. If you have a limitation as a Canadian or a United
States land investor in a restricted zone, you could likely do away with
that limitation by most favored treatment or most favorable of all treat-
ments.
5. NAFTA honors the extraction, production, sale and investment in nine basic petrochemicals
in Mexico as reserved under Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution: methane, ethane, butane,
propane, pentane, hexane, heptane, naphtha and carbon black feed stocks. NAFTA, supra note 1,
art. 601.
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